Public Use in Eminent Domain:  Are there Limits After Oakland Raiders and Poletown? by Crabtree, Susan
California Western Law Review 
Volume 20 Number 1 Article 14 
10-1-1983 
Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are there Limits After Oakland 
Raiders and Poletown? 
Susan Crabtree 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Crabtree, Susan (1983) "Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are there Limits After Oakland Raiders and 
Poletown?," California Western Law Review: Vol. 20 : No. 1 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss1/14 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 20 Cal. W. L. Rev. 82 1983-1984 
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Wed Sep 28 14:45:44 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
1
Crabtree: Public Use in Eminent Domain:  Are there Limits After Oakland Rai
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
NOTES
Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits
After Oakland Raiders and Poletown?
INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain is a governmental power used to acquire pri-
vate property without the owner's consent.' The use of eminent
domain is restrained by the requirements of public use and just
compensation. 2 Some have viewed the public use limitation as a
dying concept.3 The debate over the boundaries of public use is
again at issue as a result of the decisions in Poletown Neighbor-
hood Council v. City of Detroit4 and City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders.5
In Oakland Raiders, the California Supreme Court concluded
that the owning and operating of a sports franchise may be a valid
public use.6 The eminent domain proceeding, initiated by the
city, was sent back to the trial court for a decision on the merits.7
Prior decisions in this area of recreational public use have held
that construction and operation of a sports stadium for both pro-
1. 1 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed.
1981) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]; Humbach, A Unifying Theoryfor the Just-Com-
pensation Cases: Takings, Regulation andPublic Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 249 &
n. 33 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Humbach]. Eminent domain is distinct from inverse
condemnation. In an inverse condemnation, the government places restrictions on
the use and enjoyment of the property through its police power. In contrast, eminent
domain involves the compulsory transfer of the property to the government.
2. See, e.g., People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 340 P.2d 598, 601, (1959);
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 629, 304 N.W.2d
455, 457 (1981).
3. Comment, The Public Use Limitation of Eminent Domain: An Advance Re-
quiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Public Use]. See also
Berger, he Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REv. 203, 223-26
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Berger]. Berger takes the position that the public use re-
quirement has not been removed, since courts still provide a check on a taking that
goes too far. He goes on to state, "It is impossible to distinguish rationally a large
plant employing half the town and a railroad right of way, saying there may be con-
demnation in the latter case but not in the former." Id. at 226. In essence this was the
dilemma in Poletown, and the basis of the decision.
4. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
5. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
6. .d. at 72, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681. The case was remanded to
the trial court to determine if there was a valid public use in this situation. On July
22, 1983 the court ruled against the city of Oakland citing the city's failure to show
that the team was necessary either for the economic health or well-being of Oakland.
The case is now pending before the appellate courts.
7. Id. at 63, 646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
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EMINENT DOMAIN
fessional and amateur events was a proper public use.8
In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court held that eminent
domain could be utilized for the sole purpose of alleviating unem-
ployment and retaining local industries.9 The Poletown decision
is a sharp departure from economic and residential redevelopment
cases wherein only slum clearance satisfied the public use element
necessary for condemnation.10
The dissents in both Oakland Raiders and Poletown asserted
that the application of public use had become unlimited, and
therefore public use no longer served as an effective restraint on
the indiscriminate use of eminent domain.'1 The potential for
abuse of this governmental power clearly troubled the dissenting
justices. 12
This Note examines the public use issue in the aftermath of
Oakland Raiders and Poleown. First, it briefly discusses the his-
torical background of eminent domain and the concept of prop-
erty rights. The second section will examine the fluid nature of
public use. The third section will analyze recreational public use,
and contrast these limits with the decision as set forth in Oakland
Raiders. Next, it will focus on the Poletown decision in light of
prior redevelopment cases. Finally, the Note will explore the
ramifications of an unrestrained public use standard and examine
the manner in which public use can be harnessed.
8. See, e.g., Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 492, 218 A.2d 906 (1966). The
city authorized a municipal debt in order to construct Pittsburgh stadium. The au-
thorization of the debt by the government, like eminent domain, must comply with
the public use requirement. Often an eminent domain proceeding will also rely on
debt authorization decisions. For instance, in Oakland Raiders the court based its
ruling on Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 A.2d 894 (1966) (upheld city
ordinance authorizing loan to build a sports stadium). See also City of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 333 P.2d 745 (1959) (struck down a taxpayers' suit to
stop construction of a stadium); Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 35 Ohio App. 20, 171
N.E. 606 (Ct. App. 1930) (permitted issuance of bonds to build stadium). See gener-
ally Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 A.2d 894 (1966). The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court stated that while operation of the stadium was permissable,
the private business of owning and managing a professional team would be a private
not a public use. 1d.
9. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 632, 304
N.W.2d 455, 458 (1981).
10. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954). The lower court upheld the
constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-701-19 (1951), which provided for condemnation. It held the property
could only be condemned for the reasonable necessities of slum clearance and pre-
vention. (Citing Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F.Supp. 705, 724-25 (D.D.C.
1953)).
11. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Today the use of eminent domain is, without question, a legiti-
mate tool of government. Eminent domain is the process whereby
the sovereign is permitted to take private property for public use
without the owner's permission. 13 It has been described as "an
inherent attribute of sovereignty."' 14 This exercise of power for
the public good has been viewed as "necessary to the very exist-
ence of the government."' 15 It has enabled government to provide
services and projects that benefit the entire society which would
not be possible without the use of eminent domain.
The first significant limitation upon this inherent power can be
found in the Magna Carta. This historic document limited the
power of the king to take private property by declaring that "no
freeman shall be. . . deprived of his freehold. . . unless by law-
fuljudgment of his peers and by the law of the land."'16 However,
there were no provisions in the Magna Carta for compensation to
the land owner. 17 By the time of the American Revolution emi-
nent domain was a well-recognized governmental tool, and limita-
tions were placed on the exercise of eminent domain in the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution. The amendment
asserted that no person could be deprived of "property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."' 8 With the addition of the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution, the states were compelled
to apply the due process clause of the fifth amendment to their
exercise of eminent domain. 19
13. See NICHOLS, supra note I, at § 1.11.
14. City of Anaheim v. Michel, 259 Cal. App. 2d 835, 837, 66 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545
(Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Sovereign is defined as "having supreme rank or power; self-
governing; independent." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1236 (1979).
15. NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 1.14(2).
16. Magna Carta art. 39 (1215).
17. Id.
18. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 340 P.2d
598, 601 (1959); City of Anaheim v. Michel, 259 Cal. App. 2d 835, 837, 66 Cal. Rptr.
543, 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Eminent domain proceedings as we know them are an
outgrowth of "inquest of office." Jurors in this proceeding examined any act by the
king where the king felt he was entitled to possess private property. NICHOLS, supra
note 1, at § 1.21(1). Since eminent domain is an inherent attribute of the sovereign,
the fifth amendment is regarded as placing a limitation upon the government's use of
eminent domain. Comment, Public Use, supra note 3, at 599-600.
19. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The use of eminent domain became more
prevalent as states used their power in favor of the developing railroads that linked
the country together. Because the population was sparse in many regions of the coun-
try, few landowners were affected to any substantial degree. Comment, Public Use,
supra note 3, at 602-03. But f Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (where the use of eminent domain affected
3,438 people who lost their homes, required the destruction of 1,176 structures and
involved a cost of $200,000,000 to the public).
[Vol. 20
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Because the power of eminent domain is so extraordinary, there
has been a recognition that it must be exercised with caution.20 It
has been observed that next to the power of military conscription,
eminent domain is "the most awesome grant of power under the
law of the land."'2 ' Furthermore, since the right to acquire and
possess property is a fundamental right under the Constitution, it
has been held that property rights should be jealously guarded. 22
The tradition of protecting property rights was reaffirmed in
1972 by the United States Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp.23 Justice Stewart said:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to
enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the
right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal"
right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a
home, or a savings account. In fact, fundamental interdepen-
dence exists between the personal right to liberty and the per-
sonal right in property. Neither could have meaning without
the other.24
This reaffirmation of property rights is in line with the perception
that governmental actions impact upon our lives. The taking of
private property affects not only the property itself but the rights
and life of the property owner. Therefore, property should not be
viewed apart from ownership. Ownership rights are not a sepa-
rate and distinct component; the disposition of property naturally
affects the owners of the property.25
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE CONCEPT
Public use is an essential and necessary element in any exercise
of eminent domain. In fact, eminent domain can only be used to
acquire property for public, not private use.26 There are two dis-
20. See Winger v. Aires, 371 Pa. 242, 244, 89 A.2d 521, 522 (1952) (overturning
the use of eminent domain by the school board because there was no evidence of
necessity for the condemnation of such a large parcel of land).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Coconut Grove Marine Properties, Inc., 358 So. 2d
1151, 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Karesh v. City Council, 271 S.C. 339, 342, 247
S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978).
23. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
24. Id. at 552; see also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 772 (1964).
Reich noted that the view of property rights has not been consistent throughout
American history. The emphasis of the reform movement during the industrial
revolution was on the protection of the common man. One goal of the movement was
to place restrictions on the use of the exercise of private powers. Property rights were
regarded as the enemy of liberty, and were separated from any notions of ownership.
25. Humbach, supra note 1, at 246. This notion of property rights corresponds
with that presented in the article. "[T]he word 'property' will refer to this latter con-
ceptual construct-the ownership rather than the thing owned." Id.
26. People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 340 P.2d 598, 601 (1959); City of
1983]
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tinct schools of interpretation on exactly what is public use.27 Ju-
risdictions which have followed the narrow interpretation hold
that public use means use by the public.28 The more commonly
held view and the view adopted by the United States Supreme
Court29 interprets public use to mean public advantage. 30
In Karesh v. City Council 31 the South Carolina Supreme Court,
following the narrow view of public use, stated that before emi-
nent domain could be invoked the public must have an enforcea-
ble right to a definite and fixed use of the property.32 It is not
enough that the public will receive benefit from the acquisition of
the property.33 The South Carolina Supreme Court clearly stated
its view of public use when it said "'public use' means just that. '34
The court refused to allow the city to condemn land for a pro-
posed parking garage and convention center, because they felt the
primary benefit would be to the developer and would be of mini-
mal advantage to the public.35 While acknowledging that other
states have permitted land to be condemned for parking facilities,
the court insisted the proposed long-term lessor, not the public,
Miami v. Coconut Grove Marine Properties, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 629,
304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1981); Karesh v. City Council, 271 S.C. 339, 342, 247 S.E.2d
342, 344 (1978).
27. Berger, supra note 3, at 204. Public use has been termed public advantage,
public welfare, public utility, and necessity of the state. The first state constitutions to
use "public use" were Virginia and Pennsylvania. The fifth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution also utilized "public use."
28. 2A NIcHoLs, supra note 1, at § 7.2(1); Berger, supra note 3, at 205; Karesh v.
City Council, 271 S.C. 339, 342, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978). See generally Comment,
Public Use, supra note 3, at 603 (The narrow public use first appeared in a New York
case, Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837). The court, in dicta,
drew a distinction between benefit to the public and that which the public had a right
to use. Id. at 60-61).
29. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
30. Id. at 33. See also 2A NICHOLS, supra note I at § 7.2(2); Comment, Public
Use, supra note 3, at 608; Berger, supra note 3, at 216. Berger maintained that while
the Court did not say the public advantage test was controlling, it clearly rejected the
use-by-the-public test. Yet, it should be noted there are jurisdictions that still follow
this view. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; Comment, Public Use, supra
note 3, at 607. The switch from use by the public to public advantage was seen in this
article to be more compatible with the social philosophy of the 20th century. Housing
and slum clearance cases illustrated how the new values were included in the broad
public use. Another example of this inclusion was national legislation that provided
federal aid to states for slum clearance and for construction of housing for low income
families. Id. This social philosophy is clearly evident from the courts declaration:
"Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease
and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people
who live there to the status of cattle." Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
31. 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
32. Id. at 344, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 342, 247 S.E.2d at 344.
35. Id. at 343, 247 S.E.2d at 344.
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would have control over the facility.36
In contrast, the broad view of public use is based on the notion
that public use is not a static concept. 37 The United States
Supreme Court in 1896 noted "what is a public use frequently and
largely depends on facts and circumstances surrounding" the pro-
posed acquisition project.38 In 1923, the Supreme Court included
public health, recreation, and enjoyment as valid public pur-
poses.39 When upholding a redevelopment project in 1954, the
Court asserted that the concept was both broad and inclusive, and
that it represented values that were spiritual, physical, and
aesthetic.40
The movement by the courts from the strict, narrow view of
public use to the broader and expanding view is due in large
measure to the change in society and the broadening scope of gov-
ernmental functions.41 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Con-
rad v. City of Pittsburgh42 approved the public financing and
construction of a municipal stadium by asserting that the goal of a
community is not merely to survive, but also to pursue and in-
crease the quality of life for the community and its citizens.43 If
public use were confined to basic services, "Such a city would be a
dreary city indeed. As man cannot live by bread alone, a city can-
not endure on cement, asphalt and sewer pipes alone." 44
36. Id. at 343-44, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
37. See Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159-60, (1896).
38. Id.
39. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707, (1923).
40. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
41. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60,72, 646 P.2d 835, 842,
183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 680 (1982); Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 15, 98 A.2d
523, 527 (1953); Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 207, 199 A.2d 834, 842, (1964); New
Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 478, 292 A.2d 580,
592 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) affd. 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972); Conrad v. City
of Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 492, 508, 218 A.2d 906, 914 (1966).
42. 421 Pa. 492, 218 A.2d 906 (1966).
43. Id. at 508, 218 A.2d at 914.
44. Id. However, as public use broadened, two issues continued to plague the
courts. The first was whether public use was satisfied if only a segment of the com-
munity received the benefits. In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112
(1896) the United States Supreme Court held that even though the use of the water
might be limited to landowners this would not defeat the public nature of the project.
It was not required that every resident have a right to the use of the water. The intent
of the legislation was to provide water so that millions of acres of otherwise worthless
land could be cultivated. Id. at 161-62. The other issue concerned gains to private
parties as a result of the taking, and subsequent resale of the land. Courts have held,
benefits to private individuals are "incidental benefits." See City of Miami v. Coco-
nut Grove Marine Properties, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634, 304 N.W.2d
455, 459 (1981). See also NiCHOLS, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent
Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS, Public Use]. "The
'incidental benefit' to a private corporation when it is the donee of the power does not
defeat the public character of the use". Id at 622. The United States Supreme Court
7
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III. PUBLIC USE IN SPORTS CONTEXT
A. Rationalefor Municipal Stadiums
One trend in the evolution of public use is well illustrated in
cases dealing with the construction of sports stadiums. As early as
1893, the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of eminent
domain for the establishment of a public park in the District of
Columbia.45 Condemnation of land for a public park was held a
proper public use.4 6 This rationale led to the recognition that
public need for recreation might be sufficient to establish the req-
uisite showing of public use to construct sports stadiums. In 1930,
an Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the construction of a municipal
stadium in Meyer v. City of Cleveland.47 The court took notice of
the wide acceptance of municipal stadiums. The court continued
to note the wealth of services and facilities that municipalities now
provide for residents. Libraries, parks, monuments, statutes, pub-
lic concerts, and public golf courses are designed to enhance the
lives of the citizens.48 There was a clear acknowledgment by the
court that society had moved beyond survival needs, and was now
concerned with enrichment of the community.
In the 1950's and 1960's there were a series of suits challenging
the construction of stadiums to house professional sports teams. 49
The suits were brought on the basis that condemnation, authoriza-
tion, and funding of these stadiums were prohibited since it was
not a valid public use. Yet the courts expanded the public use
definition of recreation to include both participation and
spectatorship,50 and indeed, many felt its benefit extended beyond
stated as long as the public purpose is established, the goal may be better served by
the private sector. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1954).
45. Shoemaker v. U.S., 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
46. Id. at 297.
47. 35 Ohio App. 20, 171 N.E. 606 (Ct. App. 1930).
48. Id. at 22-23, 171 N.E. at 606-07. The court noted the trend of authority is to
permit cities to undertake a broader ranger of projects in order to promote public
welfare and enjoyment. Stadiums are a typical example of the expansion of govern-
mental services that reflect the increased expectations of community life. The court
stated that municipal stadiums are not new and have been in existence throughout
history. At the time of the decision, there were ninety-three municipal stadiums er-
ected or in the construction process. The ancient Greeks and Romans constructed
them, and they remain as a legacy and reminder to us of their civilization. Some of
these facilities are used today. The 1896 Olympic games were held in a refurbished
Greek stadium. Id. at 23-25, 171 N.E. at 606.
49. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 333 P.2d 745
(1959); Ginsberg v. City & County of Denver, 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685 (1968);
New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 292 A.2d 580
(Super. Ct. Law Div.- 1971); Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 492, 218 A.2d 906
(1966); Martin V. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 A.2d 894 (1966).
50. This change in attitude recognized the expanding role of spectator sports to-
day which include professional football, basketball, hockey and baseball. It can be
[Vol. 20
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sports to the spirit of the country.5'
In several cases, the construction of the sports stadium was un-
dertaken specifically to entice a sports franchise to locate in their
community.5 2 In New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. Me-
Crane,5 3 the enabling legislation was designed specifically to in-
duce the location of sports franchises in their state.54 Not only
would these stadiums provide recreation to the public, they would
also provide stimulus for the economic growth and development
of the area.55 Therefore, the court held that stadiums would serve
the public with respect to recreational, cultural and economic
benefits. 56
Since the construction and operation of stadiums clearly bene-
fits private owners of various professional franchises, courts have
felt compelled to address the private benefit issue. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania viewed the advantage conferred on private
franchise owners as incidental to providing public recreation.5 7
However, the court carefully drew the distinction between a city
entering into a stadium lease with the privately owned football or
attributed to the expansion of major leagues, and competition between cities to induce
a franchise to locate in their city. Cities, the court acknowledged, benefit from reve-
nue produced by the operation of the franchise within the city. Additionally, the
athletes themselves command substantial salaries, endorse commercial products,
serve as role models, and are the subjects of many articles, and television stories. This
court also noted that spectatorship "to many people in this country [is] the greatest
possible recreation with respect to athletic activity." New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 481,292 A.2d 580, 594 (1971) (quoting Green
v. Garrett, 192 Md. 52, 61-62, 63 A.2d 326, 330 (1949)).
51. Professional sports play such an important part in our lives that the New
Jersey court remarked:
Sport is truly an international language; through it we read the minds and
hearts of the fellow members of our community, state and nation-yes, even
the world community . . . . From the four-year old slum child to the 80
year old pensioner-no longer the sole enjoyment of the wealthy and afflu-
ent--everyone has been taken up in the excitement and passion of a thrilling
play at home, a brilliant runback or a perfectly executed jump shot. We are
on that field with the team. We laugh when their play sparkles and cry
when they make fools of themselves. No matter what one thinks of Namath
and the "New York Jets," how many of us failed to experience a twinge of
his anger, and frustration when a pre-season injury sidelined him for the
year?
New Jersey Sports at 491, 292 A.2d at 600. Justice Musmanno observed that the op-
portunity to watch and enjoy athletic competition "helps to build up a healthy com-
munity." He summarized this attitude by stating that the song, "Take Me Out to the
Ball Game" symbolized our national spirit. Conrad v. City of Philadelphia, 421 Pa.
492, 507, 511, 218 A.2d 906. 914-16 (1968) (Musmanno, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., New Jersey Sports at 463, 292 A.2d at 583.
53. 119 N.J. Super. 457,292 A.2d 580 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), aff'd. 61 N.J. 1,
292 A.2d 545 (1972).
54. Id. at 463, 292 A.2d at 583.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 479, 292 A.2d at 593.
57. Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 18, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (1966).
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baseball clubs, and a city operating and owning a team. In the
latter event, the court stated the city would be engaging "in the
private business of promoting sports events. '5 8 The court asserted
that if a city took part in the business aspect, it would most likely
be a private use rather than a public use.59
B. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders
It is primarily because sports play an important role in our lives,
that the City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders60 decision has re-
ceived widespread attention. The Oakland Raiders football
franchise became the subject of an eminent domain proceeding by
the city of Oakland. In 1966, the Oakland Raiders and the Oak-
land-Alameda County Coliseum entered into a five-year lease for
the use of the Oakland Coliseum with five three-year renewal op-
tions.61 The Raiders exercised three of the options, but chose not
to exercise the option for the 1980 season.62 After contract negoti-
ations between the parties ended and the Raiders announced their
intention to move to Los Angeles, the city began eminent domain
proceedings. 63 The trial court granted a summary judgment for
the Raiders, and dismissed the suit. The California Supreme
Court overturned the decision, and sent the suit back to the trial
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
61. Id. at 63, 646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
62. Id. The plan to relocate the 1981 Super Bowl winners, the Oakland Raiders,
also encountered other legal problems. The team faced a suit by the National Foot-
ball League and its Commissioner. Lawyers for Al Davis, general managing partner
of the Raiders, successfuly defended this antitrust suit which paved the way for the
move to Los Angeles. Oakland Blitzes the Raiders, NEWSWEEK, July 26, 1982, at 68
[hereinafter cited as NEWSWEEK]. While the L.A. Coliseum is generally considered
inferior to Oakland's stadium, it had important advantages for the team's owner. The
location was superior, and the facility accommodated 47,900 more people. In addi-
tion, one hundred fifty boxes that would sell for forty thousand dollars a piece were to
be constructed by the 1983 season. Wiley, Less Than Colossal in the LA. Coliseum,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, September 6, 1982, at 22-29. Yet, another incentive for the
relocation of the franchise was the enormous revenue which would be realized from
cable television. NEWSWEEK, supra note 62, at 68.
63. Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60,
646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982) [copy on file in the offices of California West-
ern Law Review]. This action was prompted by the Oakland city officials' belief that
the loss of the Oakland Raiders would result in both economic and social losses. This
social loss of community spirit and pride was recognized by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 492, 218 A.2d 906 (1966), as a
likely result of losing a major league team. The court observed that the "electrifying
sensation" of a championship game would, at least temporarily, erase the problems
and troubles that overwhelmed the city's residents. This heavy weight would be
"drowned out in a flood of throbbing anticipations." The court concluded by saying
that for a city to suffer the loss of its team would be a tragedy for the community. Id.
at 509, 218 A.2d at 914.
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court to decide if indeed the acquisition of the team is an appro-
priate public use; thereby substantially expanding the public use
definition in the sports field.64 Perhaps in response to the atten-
tion received by the decision, the court issued a modified deci-
sion.65 However, the court continued to maintain that the
operation of a sports franchise may be an appropriate municipal
function. 66 This decision takes a quantum jump from providing a
community with a sports stadium to the operation of a profes-
sional sports franchise by a municipality.
The California Supreme Court reasoned that the concept of
public use is not only broad, but that it must expand to meet
changing public needs.67 Additionally, the court cited the recent
revisions in the California Government Code which permit a city
to "acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry
out any of its powers or functions." 68 The intent of the revisions
was to give a city considerable latitude in identifying and imple-
menting public uses.69
The court in its first ruling attempted to justify its conclusion
with the short sentence, "Times change. '70 Although this was de-
leted in the final decision, the court stood by the rationale that
there has been consistent expansion of eminent domain to take
64. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 63-64, 646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
See also NEWSWEEK, supra note 62, at 68; Studer, Government in the Locker Room,
San Diego Union, July 4, 1982, at C-I [hereinafter cited as Studer].
65. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673. See gener-
ally NEWSWEEK, supra note 62, at 68 (reported the court rested its opinion on the
notion that times change. This was deleted from the modified opinion.) See infra
note 67 and accompanying text. Some California legislators were outraged, and State
Senator William Campbell introduced legislation to exempt sports franchises from
eminent domain. He remarked, "Using the court's logic the city of Anaheim could
take over the Rams or even Disneyland." NEWSWEEK, supra note 62, at 68. The
initial decision was City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d 656 (1982).
66. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 72, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
67. Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
68. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 37350.5 (Deering 1974 & Supp. 1982).
69. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 69-70, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679;
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d 656, 668 (1982) [copy on file in the
offices of California Western Law Review]. Writing for the majority, Justice Rich-
ardson rejected, as have other courts, the limited narrow use. He observed that limits
on the application of eminent domain were largely by tradition, and that the limits
were not imposed either by statute or the constitution. Thus, the evolving nature of
public use would not prohibit the taking of a sports franchise. After all, "times
change". Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
The reasoning process remained intact, although the phrase "times change" was
removed.
70. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d 656, 668; see also NEws-
WEEK, supra note 62, at 68; Studer, supra note 64, at C-1. This particular sentence,
"Times change" received widespread attention. There was amazement among the
press that a precedent and landmark case would be justified by the trite statement of
"Times change." Subsequently, it was omitted from the modified decision.
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property for recreational purposes.71 The court relied on the lan-
guage, "anything calculated to promote the education or recrea-
tion of the people is a proper public purpose,"72 found in Egan P.
City & County of San Francisco 73 and New Jersey Sports & Exposi-
tion Authority v. McCrane74 to reinforce their conclusions. This
"literal use" should be questioned since the cases the court relied
upon did draw careful distinctions between public and private
use.75 Arguably, it is more likely this language reflected the devel-
oping latitude of public use, and not the total removal of all
boundaries to public use. The literal application of "anything cal-
culated" was used to bridge the gap between owning and operat-
ing a stadium, and owning and operating a team.
To reach the conclusion that the operation of a sports franchise
may be an appropriate city function, the court relied on those de-
cisions, formerly discussed, which permitted the acquisition, con-
struction and operation of a stadium. 76 The opinion
acknowledged that "No case anywhere of which we are aware has
held that a municipality can acquire and operate a professional
football team. ' 77 The modified decision noted the city of Visalia
owns and operates a Class-A baseball franchise.78 The initial de-
71. OaklandRaiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 71,646 P.2d at 841, 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
72. Id.
73. 165 Cal. 576, 582, 138 P. 294, 296 (1913).
74. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 482,
292 A.2d 580, 594-95 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), relied on Martin v. Philadelphia,
420 Pa. 14, 215 A.2d 894 (1966), which drew a distinct line between the operation of a
stadium and entering into the business of sports. Id. at 18, 215 A.2d at 896. See also
supra note 56 and accompanying text. In Egan, the court acknowledged the trend
was to permit municipalities to undertake a wider range of projects to promote public
welfare and enjoyment. Yet, the California Supreme Court did not approve the
agreement between the Musical Association of San Francisco and the city. After the
opera house was to be constructed, title would revert to the city, but the association
would retain management and control of the facility. Thus, the court did not use a
literal interpretation of "anything calculated to promote" to sanction a beneficial pro-
ject that did not conform to the public use requirement. Egan, 165 Cal. at 576, 133 P.
at 294.
75. Egan, 165 Cal. at 576, 133 P. at 294.
76. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60,71, 646 P.2d 835, 842, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 680 (1982).
77. Id. at 70, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
78. Id. The city of Oakland does not intend to own the franchise itself, but will
resell it to businessmen. There is, of course, dispute over the value of the team. City
officials estimate the worth of the franchise at thirty million dollars, while Al Davis
insists the team is valued at one hundred million dollars. NEWSWEEK, supra note 62,
at 68. The NFL Commissioner in an affidavit indicated that a "brief interim owner-
ship" by the city would not be prohibited by the rules of the NFL. Oakland Raiders
at 73, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681; see also supra note 44, note 79 and
accompanying text. Because the subsequent ownership by private individuals does
not conflict with the public use doctrine, the cost of acquisition is likely to be within
the city's abilities. Prompt resale would quickly recoup the sale price of the team
without a permanent expenditure by the city. NEWSWEEK, supra note 62, at 68.
Vol. 20
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cision stated the difference between owning and operating a sta-
dium, and owning and managing a team was "legally
insubstantial." Further, the court noted they could not discern a
"valid legal reason" why owning and managing a team was not as
"equally permissible" as owning and operating the stadium where
the team played.79 In contrast, the modified decision of August 5,
1982 appeared to pull back from this assertion. Instead of assert-
ing that the difference was legally insubstantial, the court now
posed it in the form of a question. Was the difference "legally
substantial?"80 The court stated the Oakland Raiders had pro-
duced no valid legal basis to conclude it was not legally
insubstantial.8'
It is this apparent removal of limitation on public use that
prompted the concurring and dissenting opinion of the California
Chief Justice. The dissent noted that this use of eminent domain
was "not only novel but virtually without limit. '8 2 It stated that
no case previously has held that the operation of a sports franchise
was a valid public use. The Chief Justice was disturbed that the
majority had not examined "the ultimate consequence of their ex-
pansive decision."8 3
IV. PUBLIC USE IN REDEVELOPMENT
A. Rationale for Redevelopment
Condemnation by eminent domain of blighted property for re-
development is another line of cases that shows a dramatic expan-
sion of the public use concept. In 1954, a California District Court
of Appeals decision stated that not to view redevelopment as a
legitimate public use "is to view present day conditions under my-
opic eyes of years now gone. '8 4 With this rationale the court ap-
proved a redevelopment plan that included not only substandard
dwellings, but also vacant land in the area.85 Additionally, the
court reiterated the postion that benefits to private persons did not
Without this arrangement the cost of the action would be prohibitive. For instance, a
hundred million dollars valuation would be equal to two-thirds of Oakland's annual
budget.
79. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d 656, 667 (1982) [copy on file
in the offices of California Western Law Review].
80. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
81. Id.; see supra notes 63-64.
82. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
(Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Redevelopment Agency of City & County of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122
Cal. App. 2d 777, 803, 266 P.2d 105, 122 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
85. Id. at 800, 266 P.2d at 122.
1983]
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destroy the public purpose of slum clearance.8 6
In the landmark case of Berman v. Parker,8 7 the United States
Supreme Court approved the use of eminent domain to carry out
the intentions of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of
1945.88 The legislation declared that slums were injurious to pub-
lic health, safety, morals, and welfare and that eradication of
blighted areas was a proper public use.8 9 Further, Congress in-
tended that private enterprise be selected over public agencies in
carrying out the redevelopment plan.90 In Berman, the attack on
the redevelopment act was two-fold. First, the owners contended
that their structures within the blighted area were not substan-
dard. The court set forth that it was permissible to condemn an
entire area including structures that were not substandard. In or-
der to achieve the goal of eliminating all causes of slum condi-
tions, the area must be planned as a whole.91 Unless all structures
including those that are not substandard are removed, the prob-
lem would only be addressed on a piecemeal basis stated the
Court. Justice Douglas asserted this would serve only to mask the
problem and the result would be only palliative.92
Redevelopment not only benefitted society, but resulted in pri-
vate gains for individuals or corporations who assisted in revitali-
zation of the area. The United States Supreme Court ended all
controversy on this point when it stated that slum clearance itself
satisfied the public use requirement.93 As a result, government
actively sought the participation of the private sector. Apparently,
this was a recognition that the problem necessitated resources be-
yond those that government alone could provide, and therefore
industry could assist in the financing of the plan and continue as
an employer. In a 1975 New York Court of Appeals case,94 the
Otis Elevator Company became a sponsor under a federal clear-
ance and redevelopment program which would ultimately pay
part of the cost of acquiring the land.95 The particular land taken
86. Id. at 801, 266 P.2d at 121.
87. 348 U.S. 28 (1954).
88. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-701-19 (1951). See id. at 28-29.
89. Berman, at 32-33. The court asserted public use represents values that "are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary." Id. The court was so
horrified with slum conditions that it compared residents' status to that of cattle and
declared that their lives were an insufferable burden. Id. Clearly, the court believed
that government should strive to enrich the communities.
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id. at 34.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327,
373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975).
95. Id. at 481,335 N.E.2d at 330, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 116. See NICHOLS, Public Use,
[Vol. 20
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by eminent domain would then be used for the expansion of Otis's
existing plan facilities.96 The court ruled that there was nothing
inherently wrong in exercising eminent domain to serve not only
the redevelopment of blighted areas, but also to entice Otis Eleva-
tor Company to remain in the community. 97 The court went on to
observe that the role of private industry was not only desirable,
but also was a measure of the soundness and stability of the
project.98
Meeting the housing needs of the ghetto's poor was only a par-
tial solution. The decayed economic conditions persisted and be-
came a cancer that permeated and continued to destroy the entire
neighborhood. As a result, a shift in emphasis occurred in rede-
velopment. If conditions were to improve, it would be necessary
to eradicate and rebuild the blighted commercial area. In People
ex rel City of Urban v. Paley,99 commercial redevelopment was
proposed to remove present blight and economic deterioration,
and to halt its proliferation. °0 The Illinois Supreme Court held
that economic development, which was the primary emphasis of
the statute, satisfied the public use requirement.' 0 ' The court
stated:
[T]oday's decision denotes that the application of the public-
purpose doctrine to sanction urban redevelopment can no
longer be restricted to areas where crime, vacancy, or physical
decay produce undesirable living conditions or imperil public
health. Stimulation of commercial growth and removal of eco-
nomic stagnation are also objectives which enhance the public
weal.' 02
Thus, the scope of eminent domain reached to include poverty-
stricken business districts as the perception of slum conditions
expanded.
supra note 44, at 622. The article maintained that when the public use element was
satisfied, it was immaterial that the private party paid the compensation or enjoyed
"the lion's share of the use." Id.
96. Yonkers Community Development, 37 N.Y. 2d at 483, 335 N.E.2d at 331, 373
N.Y.S. 2d at 118.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 482, 335 N.E.2d at 331, 373 N.Y.S. 2d at 117-18.
99. 68 IM. 2d 62, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977).
100. Id. at 74, 368 N.E.2d at 920.
101. Id. This case was also cited as authority in a subsequent case, City of Chi-
cago v. Gorham, 80 Il1. App. 3d 496, 499, 400 N.E.2d 42, 45 (App. Ct. 1980) for the
proposition that slum clearance in a blighted commercial area, as well as a residential,
satisfies the public use element and that commercial growth and removal of economic
deterioration are valid public uses. The cases illustrate the trend toward the economic
revitalization of communities since intent of the statute could be directed at the eco-
nomic redevelopment of the commercial blighted area. The scope of permissible ac-
tion was enlarged when it was acknowledged that economic decay and
unemployment are as detrimental as slum housing.
102. Paley, 68 IM. 2d at 74-75, 368 N.E.2d at 920-21.
1983]
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B. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit10 3 the
Michigan Supreme Court significantly expanded the application
of public use economic redevelopment. In the spring of 1980,
General Motors Corporation (G.M.) informed the city of Detroit
that they planned to close their inner city Cadillac and Fischer
plants. 1°4 However, G.M. stated that if a suitable site could be
found, a new assembly plant would be built in the city.105 G.M.
set out criteria for a new site and set a May, 1981 deadline for a
transfer of land to G.M. 10 6 Both G.M. and the city knew that
there was no existing location available which would meet the
company's demands unless the city acquired the land.10 7 After the
city government located an acceptable parcel, the Detroit Eco-
nomic Development Corporation approved the project plan on
September 30, 1980. By October 31, 1980, the city council had
passed a resolution approving the project, which was signed by the
mayor on November 3, 1980.108 Within this selected site was the
small and tightly knit community of Poletown. Eminent domain
proceedings were undertaken. 10 9 The case went directly from the
103. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
104. Id. at 636, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 652, 304 N.W.2d at 467 (Ryan J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 651, 304 N.W.2d at 467; See Bixby, Condemnation of Private Property in
Order to Construct General Motors Plant isfor "Public Use' Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City ofDetroit, 13 URB. LAW. 694 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Bixby]: Bixby
characterized the actions of city officials in their search for a site as full of "mission-
ary zeal." Id. Justice Ryan's dissent described all the governmental actions as being
"caught up in the frenzy of perceived economic crisis." Poletown, 410 Mich. at 646,
304 N.W.2d at 465; see also infra note 134 and accompanying text.
108. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 653, 304 N.W.2d at 468; see The Last Day of
Poletown, TIME, March 30, 1981, at 29 [hereinafter cited as TIME]. The city and other
officials attempted to justify the action by noting the city gave "generous benefits" to
offset the resettlement costs. The benefits included allowances of up to $15,000 for
homeowners and $4,000 for renters. The city purchased federally owned housing for
resale to Poletown residents with a "bargain 9.5 percent interest." The action was
welcomed by some residents as an opportunity to leave an aging community, and at
the same time, receive a satisfactory price for their homes. There was a distinct fail-
ure in all of this rationalization to recognize that the essential issue was not compen-
sation, but whether the condemnation was for the private use of General Motors; see
infra note 134, and accompanying text. See also supra note 107.
109. Poletown, at 655, 304 N.W.2d at 469. The construction of the new General
Motors plant would employ 6,150 people and was expected to generate additional
jobs, business activity and taxes. However, 3,438 people would lose their homes and
1,176 structures would be destroyed. Id. at 645 & n. 15, 304 N.W.2d at 464 & n. 15;
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lower court to the Michigan Supreme Court, bypassing the court
of appeals.110 The Michigan Supreme Court issued its opinion on
March 13, 1981 meeting the May 1st deadline imposed by G.M. I
It is important to note that the city of Detroit did not proceed
under the urban renewal statutes.1 12 It did not attempt to justify
the eminent domain proceedings on the basis that the area was
either a commercial or residential slum as prior decisions man-
dated. 113 Instead, the action took place under the Economic De-
velopment Corporations Act 14 whose goal was to alleviate and
prevent conditions of unemployment and to assist and retain local
industries. 115
The per curiam opinion by the Michigan Supreme Court found
the transfer of the private property to G.M. satisfied the public use
element, because this action would add jobs and taxes to the eco-
nomic base of the community. 16 The court held the use of emi-
nent domain was proper to alleviate unemployment and revitalize
the community's economic base. 17 The benefit G.M. acquired
was viewed as incidental.1 8 Incidental is defined as a minor con-





General Motors would pay little more than $8,000,000. Id. at 656 & n. 7, 304 N.W.2d
at 469 & n. 7; See, Pushing the Boundaries of Eminent Domain, BUSINESS WEEK, May
4, 1981, at 174 [hereinafter cited as BusINEss WEEK]. Emmett S. Moten, director of
the Community and Economic Development Department was quoted as saying "It
comes down to 20 people holding up the city". Id. Moten reported that 1,154 prop-
erty owners-ninety percent of those involved-had cooperated in the sale of their
homes to the city. TIME, supra note 108, at 29.
110. Bixby, supra note 107, at 695; Poletown, 410 Mich. at 628-38, 304 N.W.2d at
457-661. The trial court ruled in favor of the city of Detroit. The Poletown Neighbor-
hood Council had challenged the action on two grounds. The first and central issue
was whether the condemnation was for public use. The plaintiffs also asserted that
the proposed project would violate the Michigan Environmental Protection Act be-
cause General Motors's new plant would have an adverse impact on the social and
cultural environment of Poletown. Both the majority opinion and the Fitzgerald dis-
sent rejected this argument. Id.
11. Poletown, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455.
112. Id. at 640, 304 N.W.2d at 462, n.9.
113. Id. See BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 109, at 174. Professor Lance Liebman
of Harvard Law School stated that the significance of the decision was that public use
doctrine can be used in new areas: "But it extends the rationale of public use to jobs
and economic development and means that municipal governments may gain more
flexibility in dealing with purely economic problems." Id.
114. MICH CoMp. LAws. ANN. § 125.1601 (1976).
115. Poletown, at 630-31, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
116. Id. at 629, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
117. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
118. Id.
119. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 655 (1979).
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tualize how benefit to a company, whose primary motive is profit,
can be termed merely incidental to the public gain. The court
went on to state "If the public benefit was not so clear and signifi-
cant we would hesitate to sanction approval of such a project.120
Yet, nowhere does the court articulate guidelines or criteria to as-
sist cities or courts confronted by a similar situation. For instance,
could a smaller company faced with a higher unemployment rate
anticipate equally favorable treatment or, is it limited to the For-
tune 500 companies? The court is completely silent as to the man-
ner by which it arrived at its conclusion.
There were two separate dissents in Poletown. The dissent of
Justice Fitzgerald noted that no precedent existed in Michigan for
this decision. Redevelopment cases that involved resale to private
parties were based on the public use requirement of slum clear-
ance. In contrast to redevelopment public use, the dissent pointed
out "it is only through the acquisition and use of the property by
General Motors that the 'public purpose' of promoting employ-
ment can be achieved."' 21 Thus, there is nothing to distinguish
this public benefit from that realized by any other private corpo-
ration. The potential abuse of eminent domain was clear, 22 since
the decision removed all limits upon the government's use of such
enormous power.123
Further, the lengthy and vigorous dissent by Justice Ryan an-
nounced that the law of eminent domain had been significantly
altered and that it seriously endangered "the security of all private
property ownership."'124 Justice Ryan viewed property as a total
concept in which ownership cannot be separated from the "prop-
erty" itself. His dissent also stated that eminent domain was now
"on a spectrum that admits of no principles and therefore no
limits."1
2 5
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF OAKLAND AIDERS AND POLETOWN
These decisions dramatically affect the concept of public use,
and as a result troubling questions are posed. Is public use so
inclusive that any benefit to the public can satisfy this require-
ment? Can we permit economic problems to be solved by severely
impacting the property rights of both individuals and busi-
nesses? 26 Eminent domain has been a valuable tool in addressing
120. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
121. Id. at 641, 304 N.W.2d at 462 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 641, 304 N.W.2d at 463.
123. Id. at 644, 304 N.W.2d at 464.
124. Id. at 645, 304 N.W.2d at 464-65 (Ryan J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 680-81, 304 N.W.2d at 480.
126. When the Raiders left Oakland, the city was expected to lose at least thirty
[Vol. 20
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social problems, but can it continue to be utilized without creating
enormous problems of its own, or will we discover that the solu-
tion is far worse than the problem? Property does not exist in a
vacuum, and it only has meaning when it is attached to people.
Eminent domain affects ownership rights as well as the lives of the
owners. It is this aspect that makes the potential for abuse so
alarming.
. Both cases have a great deal in common. The decisions were
without precedent, 127 and the result was the removal of limitations
on the concept of public use.' 28 Likewise, the ramifications of the
decisions are in some aspects quite similar. In Oakland Raiders,
the court concluded it may be an appropriate governmental func-
tion to acquire and operate an ongoing and viable business if that
business encompasses a public use value such as recreation.129
The eminent domain proceedings were triggered by the intention
of the sports franchise to relocate.1 30 In this respect, Oakland
Raiders is similar to Poletown. In Poletown the action likewise
was prompted when a major industry announced it would relocate
unless another site in the community could be found. 31 The
court sanctioned the use of eminent domain to transfer property
that was not blighted to a private corporation in hopes of lessen-
ing unemployment.132
million dollars. The city was already hard-hit by the recession and loss of local prop-
erty tax revenue due to Proposition 13. Studer, supra note 64. In City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 833, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982) the city's
attorneys were fearful "delicate negotiations" for financing of its massive economic
redevelopment would be upset since Oakland was marketing itself as a progressive,
growing, "major league" city. Additionally, the loss of the Raiders would have an
adverse affect upon "civic pride and unity". Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, City of Oak-
land v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982) [copy
on file in the offices of California Western Law Review]. This same sense of commu-
nity pride and spirit was recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when re-
viewing an action that would provide a new stadium for Pittsburgh. "[Wlhere are the
Pirates to battle for the glory and pride of Pittsburgh, if the stadium is not con-
structed?" Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 492, 509, 218 A.2d 906, 914 (1966).
The economic situation was far more severe for Detroit. Unemployment in Michigan
was 14.2 percent, in Detroit at 18 percent, and Detroit's black citizens had an unem-
ployment rate of 30 percent. Ford, American Motors, and General Motors reported
the largest financial losses in their histories. Chrysler required federal bailout funds
to stay afloat. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616,
647, 304 N.W.2d 455, 465 (1981) (Ryan J., dissenting).
127. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60,70, 646 P.2d 835, 841, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 679 (1982); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410
Mich. 616, 640, 304 N.W.2d 455, 462 (1981).
128. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683;
Poletown, 410 Mich. at 644, 304 N.W.2d at 646.
129. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 72, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
130. Id. at 63, 646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
131. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 649-50, 304 N.W.2d at 466.
132. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
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The dissents shared a common fear that the removal of limits
from public use would open the floodgates to abuse. While a
city's motives may be noble and altruistic, it can be argued that
these motives do not always result in the just exercise of municipal
power. Justice Ryan felt compelled to write a dissent in Poletown
as a warning to other jurisdictions who, under substantial eco-
nomic pressures, could find themselves in a similar situation. 33
He wrote:
Finally, it seems important to describe in detail for the bench
and bar who may address a comparable issue on a similarly
stormy day, how easily government, in all of its branches,
caught up in the frenzy of perceived economic crisis, can disre-
gard the rights of the few in allegiance to the always disastrous
philosophy that the end justifies the means. 134
The G.M. plant had the full approval of labor, business, industry,
government, finance, and to some extent the news media. The
only opposition came from a small minority of Poletown residents
whose lives were profoundly affected. 135
The concern over the apparent limitless public use was mani-
fested in the dissents of both cases. The Oakland Raiders dissent
brought out several questions raised in the case in an attempt to
determine how far the public use concept had been expanded.
The major question was whether the city had the power to con-
demn a viable, ongoing business, and resell it to another private
party, in order to prevent that business from relocating? 36 The
potential for abuse of eminent domain to prevent a business from
relocating was discussed by California Chief Justice Bird. She
stated: "It strikes me as dangerous and heavyhanded for the gov-
ernment to take over a business, including all of its intangible as-
sets, for the sole purpose of preventing its relocation."' 137
The Poletown dissent by Justice Fitzgerald foresaw a different
set of problems with the elimination of the public use requirement
of slum clearance. Since Poletown was not a blighted area, the
dissent asserted that under the majority opinion no matter how
133. Id. at 646, 304 N.W.2d at 465.
134. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 646, 304 N.W.2d at 465.
135. Id. at 684, 304 N.W.2d at 482. Time magazine reported the support for De-
troit's action was widespread, and the new General Motors plant was considered es-
sential for the health of Detroit. The Poletown situation was viewed as more than the
condemnation of Poletown. The proposed General Motors factory would offer "new
hope to a decaying city that has hemorrhaged hundreds of thousands of jobs over the
past decade .... ." The article also took notice of the large $135 million budget
deficit that Detroit faced. The Detroit Free Press termed the project essential to re-
build the city's economy. TIME, supra note 108, at 29.
136. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60,77, 646 P.2d 835, 845, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 683 (1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
137. Id. at 78, 646 P.2d at 846, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
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productive or valuable a homeowner's or businessman's land is, it
is not immune from eminent domain. It could be condemned if
another private interest would put the land to a higher economic
use.138 Fitzgerald went even further to state that there is no limit
to the use of condemnation to aid a private business after the
Poletown decision.' 39 In light of the problems illuminated by Jus-
tice Fitzgerald, it is imperative that there be a meaningful restraint
on the exercise of eminent domain.
The all inclusive public use problem was considered by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court. In City and County of San Francisco v.
Ross, 14 the court prohibited the use of eminent domain to con-
demn land for the purpose of building a parking facility which
would provide the public with reasonable parking rates. The
court noted that if public use were to be given such a broad mean-
ing, all off-street parking facilities would satisfy public use, re-
gardless of ownership or primary purpose of operation.' 41
Therefore, the present question is whether public use has become
so boundless that the distinction between public need and public
use no longer exists. The answer may lie in one of the dissents in
Poletown. Michigan Supreme Court Justice Ryan felt the major-
ity equated public use to the existence of a public benefit. He
stated "although public benefit is a necessary condition, it is itself
an insufficient condition for the existence of a public use."'142
Further, he felt the impact of the majority's holding was to replace
public use with public benefit as the test in eminent domain pro-
ceedings, and therefore take away all limits from the use of emi-
nent domain. 143
The concept that property is more than just the land itself, but
also includes ownership, was reflected in the dissent of both cases.
The majority opinions are silent as to the effect on the individuals
whose property is being taken. The Oakland Raiders dissent
noted that this action affected the rights of both the owners and
the players of the team. 144 The employment contracts of the Raid-
ers players would be condemned under the eminent domain ac-
tion, and the court inquired as to whether the employees' rights
would be violated by the nonconsentual taking of their employ-
138. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 644-45,
304 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955).
141. Id. at 59, 279 P.2d at 533.
142. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 680, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
143. Id at 680-81, 304 N.W.2d at 480.
144. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 77, 646 P.2d 835, 845, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 684 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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ment contracts. 145 The Poletown dissenters concerned themselves
with the decision's effect upon the lives and rights of those whose
homes were condemned. Justice Fitzgerald noted that, "Condem-
nation places the burden of aiding industry on the few, who are
likely to have limited power to protect themselves from the ex-
cesses of legislative enthusiasm for the promotion of industry."'146
Undoubtedly, the vast resources which the government has at its
disposal can be intimidating to the individuals whose land is being
taken. Furthermore, for those who do contest the action, the judi-
cial system is very expensive.
Justice Ryan examined the extent of the burden placed on
Poletown's citizens. These people were first and second genera-
tion Americans whose home was their most valuable asset, and
whose community was a "symbol of the security and quality of
their lives."'147 Payment for their homes could never adequately
compensate them for their intangible losses. Truly, Poletown's
residents have paid an inordinate price for jobs in the
community. 48
The situation in Poletown presented an additional and unique
set of concerns. Once the transfer of the land occurred, public
control ceased. The public had no right to use the property or
direct its management. It was the contention of Ryan's dissent
that the majority sanctioned the use of eminent domain without
public accountability. G.M. is accountable to its stockholders, not
the public.149 The city of Detroit maintained neither control over
the operation, nor an interest in the land. Instead, the city must
rely on the best efforts of G.M.' 50 One should seriously question
the judgment of Detroit's public officials who sold a two-hundred
million dollar plot of land to G.M. for eight-million dollars, and
failed to retain either interest or control.' 5 With the absence of
any public control on G.M.'s use of the land, it could be argued
that the utilization of the land is for the private use of G.M.
145. Id.
146. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 641, 304 N.W.2d at 463 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 658, 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
148. See supra note 109.
149. Id. at 679, 304 N.W.2d at 480.
150. Id. at 678-80, 304 N.W.2d at 479-80; see also Egan v. City & County of San
Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 133 P. 294 (1913). The city was to have title, but no control
in the management of the opera house. In rejecting the project, the court said, "But
the beneficial attributes of ownership, over and above the naked legal title, are taken
from the city and county, and are placed in the hands of private persons." Id. at 581,
133 P. at 295.
151. In direct contrast, the California Supreme Court has held that resale of the
land taken will not defeat the public purpose so long as the property is "subject to
restrictions protecting the public use." City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44
Cal. 2d 52, 58, 279 P.2d 529, 532 (1955).
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Perhaps one of the most disturbing ramifications is in whose
hands the power of eminent domain rests. Where a corporation is
as large and influential as G.M. "the power of eminent domain,
for all practical purposes, is in the hands of the private corpora-
tion."'152 The role of a government is reduced to that of errand
boy when decisions are dictated by a private industry, and yet the
use of eminent domain is reserved exclusively for the sovereign.
Justice Ryan reflected this dilemma when he stated: "When indi-
vidual citizens are forced to suffer great social dislocation to per-
mit private corporations to construct plants where they deem it
most profitable, one is left to wonder who the sovereign is.' 15 3
In the aftermath of Oakland Raiders and Poletown, we can only
conjecture about the ultimate effect. While the full ramifications
may not be known for years, two problems are readily apparent.
Equating mere public benefit with public use has effectively de-
stroyed public use as a restraint on eminent domain. 154 Neverthe-
less, there remains one check on governmental excesses, and that
is accountability. Yet, accountability is not present in all situa-
tions. G.M. dictated terms, and an entire state struggled franti-
cally to meet G.M.'s deadline. If the exercise of eminent domain
is to be insulated from abuse, the real decisions and power must
be in hands of elected officials and the courts.
VI. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
It is the contention of this Note that public use has expanded to
such a degree that it has become a meaningless restraint upon the
application of eminent domain. The public use standard is com-
posed more of form than substance, because public use is so broad
it has become illusory. The procedural safeguards of due process
become, in effect, an empty process since the standard of public
use admits no principles or limits by which to judge the action. 155
Thus, without limitations on public use, abuse of eminent domain
is likely to occur, and is a serious cause for concern. 5 6 Certainly,
152. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 683, 304 N.W.2d at 481.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 128 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 133-34, 138-
39, and 143-44 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 82; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text. The con-
cern for abuse was indicated in the Poletown dissents, and in the Oakland Raiders
concurring and dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice. The California Chief Justice
unlike the Michigan Supreme Court Justices, did not reach a conclusion that an abuse
of the powers of eminent domain had occurred. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice felt
that removal of limits would result in an abuse "of such a great power." City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60,76, 646 P.2d 835, 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673,
683 (1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting); see supra note 21. Because this
governmental power is so great its exercise cannot be taken lightly.
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it is not desirable to return to the era of narrow public use. There-
fore, the dilemma which now exists is how to continue enjoying
the benefits, while at the same time guarding against abuse.
The legislative definition of public use is "well-nigh conclusive"
since the legislature is the "main guardian of the public needs to
be served by social legislation .... ,"157 Thus, the role of the ju-
diciary is restricted to the review of constitutional limitations
placed upon eminent domain, "public use", and "just compensa-
tion." 58 As a result, courts have been reluctant to overturn a leg-
islative determination of public use. Both the Poletown and
Oakland Raiders courts deferred to the judgment of the governing
bodies.
Seemingly, these broad statutes authorizing the use of eminent
domain vest in the city a blank check to deal with real or per-
ceived problems, and the only restraint is the city's conception of
what best serves the public needs. The hesitation by the courts to
overturn the determination of these cities reflects an unwillingness
to make the hard decisions that are necessary to set meaningful
limits on the use of eminent domain.1 59 The courts deferred to the
judgment of the city's legislative body, while at the same time the
legislature relies on the courts to curb or stop abuses. The respon-
sibility is passed back and forth with neither body taking responsi-
bility for the actions taken.
In view of the hesitation of the courts to invalidate the new ap-
157. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see also NICHOLS, Public Use,
supra note 44. It is acknowledged that the definition of public use is the prerogative
of the legislature to decide, but in the final analysis the courts must decide if the
intended use will result in a taking for private or public use. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
In Poleown the court adopted the reasoning of Berman that the decision of the legis-
lature is well-nigh conclusive, and the role of the judiciary is to decide if the exercise
of governmental power is for public use. The legislature determines if the govern-
mental action meets a public need and serves the public use. The judiciary may act
only if action is "manifestly arbitrary and incorrect." Poletown, 410 Mich. at 632-33,
304 N.W.2d at 458-59. See also Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 79, 646 P.2d at 846,
183 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (A taking decision is reversible by the court only if the legisla-
ture acted in "an arbitrary or capricious manner, or the taking reflects a gross abuse
of discretion").
158. The limitations placed upon a taking are justiciable issues. All other ques-
tions about the taking are for legislative determination. People ex rel. Department of
Public Works v. Laggiss, 223 Cal. App. 2d. 23, 33-34, 35 Cal. Rptr. 554, 560-61 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963). In Rindge v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923) the Court held that
necessity, the reason for the condemnation resolutions, is a legislative, not judicial
question. Id. at 709. See also People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304-05, 340 P.2d
598, 601 (1959). The question of public use and necessity have often been confused
when the property owner asserted that the condemning body has taken in excess of
what is needed for public use; an example of this confusion is illustrated in Laggiss.
The court upheld the taking of land to be used for a highway. However, the necessity
to condemn land for a highway is a legislative determination which can not be over-
turned by the courts. Laggiss, 223 Cal. App. 2d at 35-38, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 562-63.
159. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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plications of public use, the remedy must come from the legisla-
tures. 160 There are several possible answers. The legislature could
once again list the approved uses of eminent domain. But govern-
mental problems today are complex and defy simple solutions,
therefore, the needs and demands of modern government require
standards of legislative power that do not have precise guide-
lines.16' The revision of California's eminent domain laws reflects
the need for cities to have broad discretion in identifying and im-
plementing public uses.' 62 If rigid guidelines were enacted, the
ability of the legislature to deal with changing social problems
would be hampered.
Another solution would be to shift the burden of proof. Pres-
ently, there is a presumption which places the burden of proof on
the party whose land is being taken to show the proposed public
use is invalid. 63 Presumptions affecting the burden of proof are
created to implement public policy. 64 The policy underlying the
160. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 79, 646 P.2d 835, 846, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 685 (1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). The Chief Justice
stated relief can only be granted by the courts when the action was "completely irra-
tional." Therefore, restriction of the use of eminent domain must come from limita-
tions which the legislature imposes. Justice Richardson's majority opinion relied
upon the absence of constitutional or statutory restraints on "takings." The court
reasoned that since there was a statutory prohibition on the condemnation of an ex-
isting golf course (CAL. GovT. CODE § 37353(c)), by implication an existing business
could be acquired by eminent domain in the absence of an express ban. Oakland
Raiders at 73, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
161. See supra notes 37-44; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. In
Barry and Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wash. 2d 155, 500 P.2d
540 (1972) the court upheld a broad delegation of power to an administrative agency
citing the need for flexibility in modem government. Strictly construed standards, the
court maintained, would be logically unsound and legally meaningless because the
needs and demands of government today must be able to respond to new problems.
162. CAL. Cwy. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (Deering 1981). The broad discretion is
reflected in the statute. The Legislative Committee Comment of the statute defined
public use as all aspects of the public good including but not limited to "social, eco-
nomic, environmental and aesthetic considerations". In Oakland Raiders the court
also took notice of the broad discretion of the statutory delegation of power. The
court cited CAL. GOVT. CODE § 37350.0 which states that the city may "acquire by
eminent domain any property to carry out any of its powers or functions." Oakland
Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 72, 646, P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
163. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680; see
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
164. People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Laggiss, 223 Cal. App. 2d 23,
36-37, 35 Cal. Rptr. 554, 562-63 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). The property owner must on
his own, raise the issue of whether the taking is for public use. If the condemnee fails
to challenge the public use determination of the legislature, the condemnation resolu-
tion becomes conclusive that the property is appropriated for public use. If, however,
the party does contest the action, the legislative determination becomes prima facie
evidence that the taking is for public use, and the condemnee has the burden of proof.
Therefore, the property owner must show that there has been an abuse of discretion
by a preponderance of the evidence; see generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 602 (Deering
1966) (If a fact is prima facie evidence of another fact, for example, valid public use, a
rebuttable presumption is created); CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (Deering 1966). (The
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presumption, in this instance valid public use, is determined to be
so beneficial that it requires a finding of the presumed fact unless
there is evidence to the contrary. 65 It is conceded that when the
public use concept was in the "narrow" or early "broad" stage, the
presumption of validity aided in the effective implementation of
social policy that otherwise would have been impossible. 66
A comparable situation existed in California with zoning ordi-
nances that limited and impacted the supply of housing. Zoning
policies which once served to build healthy and safe communi-
ties 67 were now being used to restrict development 68 and many
felt this action created new housing, social, and economic
problems. The California legislature in 1980 shifted the burden of
proof on building restrictions to the city to establish that the ordi-
nance was necessary for the health, safety, and welfare of its citi-
zens. 69 Prior to the enactment, case law had a presumption in
favor of validity. 70 The legislature felt the presumption in favor
of the ordinance was no longer warranted. Restrictive building
ordinances severely limited the supply of housing, exacerbated
housing market conditions, and limited access to affordable
housing.17'
comment by the Law Revision Commission states that the party having the burden of
proof in a rebuttable presumption situation must present sufficient evidence to con-
vince the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence. In situations where it is
desirable to require a substantially greater degree of certainty, the proponent may be
required to meet a standard of clear and convincing evidence. One factor to be con-
sidered in determining if the burden of proof should be altered is public policy).
165. See generally CAL. EvID. CODE § 605 (Deering 1966) (The comment of the
Law Revision Commission states that presumptions affecting the burden of proof are
established in order to influence or carry out public policy. These policy considera-
tions are distinct or in addition to the policy surrounding the actual litigation of the
dispute).
166. See supra notes 47, 84 and 88 and accompanying text.
167. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Zoning ordi-
nances were upheld that would minimize dangers of fore or collapse, restrict over-
crowding, and exclude offensive industries from residential areas.
168. See, e.g., Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975) (the court approved the "Petaluma Plan"
which would, if similar measures were adopted by other cities in the area, result in
twenty-five percent (105,000 units) of the needed housing in the region for 1970-80);
Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (zoning ordinance
which required a minimum lot size of one acre was upheld. The practical effect of
this restriction was to prevent poor people from living in Los Altos Hills, as well as
limiting the population).
169. CAL. EVID. CODE § 699.5 (Deering 1966 and Supp. 1982).
170. 1980 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1143, Art. 10.6, Section 65580; 1980 Summary Digest at
365. Assembly Bill 3252 switched the burden of proof to the city or county. Prior to
Assembly Bill 3252, the party who challenged the ordinance was required to show
that the action lacked a real and substantial relationship to the public welfare.
171. CAL. EvD. CODE § 699.5 (Deering 1966 & Supp. 1982). The legislative com-
ment indicated that an adequate housing supply was essential for the health, safety
and welfare of all Californians.
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The unrestrained public use found in the Poletown and Oakland
Raiders decisions necessitates a reexamination of the policy con-
siderations behind the presumption. It can be argued that the pre-
sumption in favor of validity is no longer warranted in light of
these decisions. The use of eminent domain as a tool to imple-
ment policy is well-established, and its application is no longer
dependent on the presumption of validity. Some would contend
that expansive public use now creates, not solves, social and eco-
nomic problems. 172 Finally, it imposes an imposible burden of
proof upon the property owner since there are no limits on public
use. The focus must now change.' 73 Certainly, a basic civil right
such as property, deserves the protection of both the courts and
the legislature. 174
The shift in the burden of proof in its condemnation resolution
would require the legislative body to show that the proposed us-
age is valid and not an abuse of discretion.' 75 The public policy
considerations underlying the shift would be to protect against the
indiscriminate use of eminent domain, to retain public accounta-
bility, and to protect property rights. Most important, the shift
would protect the rights and lives of the property owners. 176 Frus-
tration and despair resulting from a sense of powerlessness against
government action cannot help but create social and economic
problems of its own. Yet, the shift in the burden of proof would
maintain a degree of flexibility, and at the same time guard
against the automatic approval of new and novel public uses. The
shift in the burden of proof would provide an equitable balance
between public needs and private rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The majority opinions in Poletown and Oakland Raiders have
172. See supra notes 82, 123 and 125 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
174. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). The court held
that property rights were basic civil rights, and have been regarded so for a long time.
The court cited Locke, Adams, Blackstone, and Congress to show the longstanding
tradition of property rights as basic civil rights.
175. CAL. EVID. CODE § 606 (Deering 1966). The comment by the Assembly com-
mittee would indicate that the state or municipal legislative body must be able to
demonstrate that the project was for public, not private use, and valid. In the case of
widely accepted public use, redevelopment of blighted areas, and construction and
operation of a stadium, the proponent would have substantial support against a pre-
sumption of invalid public use. The real effect would occur in those cases that are
without precedent as in Poletown and Oakland Raiders. The advantage of the shift in
the burden would be to prevent the automatic approval by the courts of new public
uses; see supra note 65. If the approach of California State Senator Campbell, which
would except condemnation of sports franchise, is adopted, the problem could only be
addressed on a piecemeal basis and would be reactive to perceived abuses.
176. See supra notes 126-54 and accompanying text.
1983]
27
Crabtree: Public Use in Eminent Domain:  Are there Limits After Oakland Rai
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
108 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
been criticized for the apparent removal of all limitations on pub-
lie use. The dissents in those cases maintain these new and novel
applications of public use are without precedent, and are likely to
result in the abuse of eminent domain. The failure by either the
California Supreme Court or the Michigan Supreme Court to ar-
ticulate meaningful guidelines concerning public use justifies this
fear. The constitutional limitation of public use has been defined
so broadly that it is no longer a restraint. Consequently, property
rights are endangered. Yet, property does not have rights, people
do. The real danger, therefore, lies in the threat to individual lib-
erties. Unless legislative action is forthcoming, there will be new
Poletown residents and new Oakland Raiders businesses.
Susan Crabtree
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